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ABSTRACT This paper investigates the gasoline price adjustment to changes in the 
input cost price for a panel of 48 U.S. states using a monthly data set covering the 
period 1994-11. We build for the first time a non-linear threshold Panel Vector-
Error-Correction Model (PVECM) and propose efficient Markov Chain Monte Carlo 
(MCMC) Bayesian techniques. Our findings indicate that states with high margin 
experience a slower adjustment and a more asymmetric response to input price cost 
shocks. Our results are robust to potential breaks in the threshold parameter, which is 
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Key words: Asymmetric price adjustment; Gasoline industry; Non-linear threshold 
PVECM; Bayesian techniques;; ‘Rockets and feathers’ hypothesis   
 
JEL classifications: C52, C11, L13  
 
 
We would like to thank the Associate Professor Sofronis Clerides, the Editor (Eleanor 
Morgan) and the two anonymous referees of this journal for very helpful comments 
and suggestions, which improved the article substantially. Any remaining errors 
belong to the authors. The usual disclaimer applies. 
 
Michael L. Polemis (corresponding author) Department of Economics, University of Piraeus 80 
Karaoli and Dimitriou Street, 18534, Piraeus, Greece, e-mail: mpolemis@unipi.gr. Mike Tsionas 
Department of Economics, Lancaster University Management School, LA1 4YX, UK and Department 
of Economics, Athens University of Economics and Business, Athens 104 34, Greece.     
2 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Consumers often tend to believe that oil companies adjust the retail gasoline prices 
more quickly to cost increases than to cost decreases, creating an asymmetric 
adjustment path towards the long-run equilibrium, known as the “rockets and 
feathers” hypothesis. This perceived asymmetry in retail price adjustment to changes 
in crude oil prices is commonly attributed to “gouging” engaged in by vertically 
integrated firms in an effort to increase retail profits, which in turn is made possible 
by their market power (Borenstein, et al, 1997, Deltas, 2008).  
Within the last years there has been a plethora of studies on the existence of 
price asymmetry in the gasoline market with controversial results. Existing literature 
differs by country, sample period, data frequency and econometric methodology. The 
majority of these studies apply cointegration techniques and especially Engle-Granger 
methodology by utilizing an asymmetric error-correction model (ECM) in order to 
uncover the existence of price asymmetries. Since the empirical literature on this topic 
is quite broad, Table 1 summarizes the main empirical findings of the investigation of 
asymmetric adjustments in terms of methodologies, dataset and study periods used. 
< Insert Table 1 about here > 
 
Bumbass et al (2015) examine the long-run relationship between the spot oil price and 
retail and wholesale gasoline prices. They use a simple Threshold Autoregressive 
Model (TAR) in order to account for the existence of price asymmetry both in the 
long and the short run. They argue that both retail and wholesale gasoline prices 
respond symmetrically to an oil price shock in the long run, indicating little market 
power by gas stations and wholesalers. Moreover, Kristoufek and Lunackova (2015), 
reinvestigate the “rockets and feathers” hypothesis by employing error correction 
methodology (ECM). They find that the prices return to their equilibrium value much 
more slowly than would be typical for the ECM suggesting the validity of the “Joseph 
effect”.   
Polemis (2012) by using the error-correction model in the Greek gasoline 
market reports that retail gasoline prices respond asymmetrically to cost increases and 
decreases both in the long and the short-run. However, within the wholesale segment, 
there is a symmetric response of the spot prices of gasoline in adjusting a to the short-
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run responses of the exchange rate. Polemis and Fotis (2011) contains an application 
of Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) panel data Error Correction Model 
(ECM) to study the transmission between crude oil prices and retail gasoline prices in 
eleven European countries from 2000 to 2011.  
      Bermingham and O’ Brien (2010) empirically test whether Irish and 
United Kingdom (UK) petrol and diesel markets are characterised by asymmetric 
pricing behaviour. The econometric assessment uses threshold autoregressive models 
and a dataset of monthly refined oil and retail prices covering the period 1997 to mid-
2009. Their study concluded that for both the Irish and UK liquid fuel markets at 
national levels, there is no evidence to support the hypothesis that retail prices rise 
faster than they fall in response to changes in oil prices (price asymmetry).   
Douglas (2010) finds little evidence of asymmetry in the transmission process 
from crude oil shocks to retail gasoline price in the United States. The author states 
that the minor evidence of asymmetry found is due to the presence of outliers in the 
data set. Clerides (2010) uses data from 2000 to 2010 for several European Union 
countries to investigate the response of retail gasoline and diesel prices to changes in 
the world oil price. The empirical findings indicate significant variation in the 
adjustment mechanism across countries. Fluctuations in the international price of oil 
are transported to local prices with some delay but evidence of asymmetric adjustment 
is fairly weak. Statistically significant evidence of asymmetric responses is only found 
in a small number of countries, while in some countries there is even (weak) evidence 
of asymmetry in the reverse direction: prices drop faster than they rise.  
Faber (2009) explores 3600 gas stations in the Netherlands from 2006 to 2008 
and concludes that gasoline price asymmetry is not a feature of the market as a whole. 
The author estimates that there are significant differences between gas stations: 38% 
of gas stations price asymmetrically and the remainder does not follow the same 
pattern. Deltas (2008) reports that U.S. states with high average retail-wholesale 
margins experienced a slower adjustment and a more asymmetric response in retail 
prices. Kuper and Poghosyan (2008) examine gasoline price asymmetry in the United 
States from 1986 to 2005.  The authors divide the period under scrutiny into two sub 
periods. The analysis of period from 1986 to 1999 indicates that wholesale segment 
adjusts the production level of crude oil to control the long run oil prices. However, 
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after 1999, the ability of wholesale producers to control the long-run price of oil has 
decreased since gasoline price symmetry holds only where the deviation from the long 
run exceeds 6%. Lastly, Galeotti et al. (2003) studied trends in Germany, France, UK, 
Italy and Spain from January 1985 to June 2000 and concluded that “rockets and 
feathers” appear to dominate the price adjustment mechanism of gasoline markets in 
many European countries.  
Based on the above, three main empirical finings emerge. First, many previous 
empirical panel data asymmetric adjustment models have been constructed under the 
assumption of treating regression functions as identical across all observations in their 
sample and not allowing them to fall into a discrete number of classes. However, this 
premise is not credible since there are good theoretical reasons and there is strong 
empirical evidence suggesting that individual observations can be divided into classes 
based on the value of an unobserved variable (Hansen, 1999, Hansen, 2000, Caner 
and Hansen, 2004). We address these limitations by estimating a threshold parameter 
in a data driven approach that “endogenously” sorts the data into different regimes. 
The threshold variable that we use to sort observations into the different regimes is the 
level of profit margin as a proxy for market power (Deltas, 2008). The partitioning 
into a discrete number of classes (or bins) is economically meaningful since it allows 
the cross sections elements of the panel (states) to be sorted according to their level of 
competition in the gasoline market segments (wholesale and retail) placing them into 
competitive (low margin states) and non-competitive (high margin states) regimes. In 
this way, our analysis accounts for the existence of price asymmetry between different 
micro-economic levels (i.e. states) and links the level of market power with the price 
adjustment mechanism.     
 Secondly, many of the empirical studies focus on the investigation of gasoline 
price asymmetry expressed in a linear form (Yang and Ye, 2008, Tappata, 2009, 
Polemis, 2012, Lewis and Noel, 2011, Clerides, 2010, Faber, 2009, Honarvar, 2009, 
Hosken et al, 2008). It is noteworthy that nonlinear models have been quite recently 
used in order to address the price relationships in oil, gasoline and related markets 
(see for example Wlazlowski, et al 2012; Greenwood-Nimmo and Shin, 2013). 
However, estimation of the model dynamics will be intensely jeopardized when a 
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nonlinear long run relationship is misspecified as linear (Blake et al, 1998, Shin et al, 
2013, Greenwood-Nimmo and Shin, 2013).  
Lastly, the majority of the existing studies (e.g. Polemis, 2012, Lewis and Noel, 
2011, Clerides, 2010, Faber, 2009, Honarvar, 2009, Valadkhani, 2009, Balmaceda 
and Soruco, 2008, Bachmeir and Griffin, 2003, Bettendorf, et al, 2003, Galeotti, et al, 
2003) have estimated Error Correction Models (ECMs) by employing the two-step 
cointegrating approach developed by Engle and Granger (1987). However, it is well 
documented in the literature that single step fully dynamic autoregressive distributed 
lag (ARDL) estimation is more efficient and yields improved performance compared 
to single equation ECMs (Banerjee et al., 1993, 1998; Pesaran and Shin, 1998; 
Pesaran et al., 2001, Greenwood-Nimmo and Shin, 2013). In order to account for this 
limitation, we use a Vector Error Correction Modelling (VECM) framework which is 
even more efficient and well suited to the joint analysis of short-run and long run 
asymmetric responses of gasoline prices to its input cost disturbances (Greenwood-
Nimmo and Shin, 2013).  
Our analysis implies that states with high profit margin experience a slower 
adjustment and a more asymmetric response compared to low profit ones. Moreover, 
the magnitude of the estimated short-run coefficients is in the most cases larger in the 
retail than in the wholesale level. However, the adjustment towards the equilibrium 
level is more gradual in the wholesale segment whereas both the wholesalers and 
retailers tend to react more to price increases than price decreases. In contrast to other 
studies (e.g Greenwood-Nimmo and Shin, 2013), we find significant evidence that the 
wholesale and retail price of gasoline before taxes and duties adjusts more rapidly in 
an upward than a downward direction.  
The motivation of this paper is to contribute to the empirical literature on retail 
and wholesale gasoline price asymmetry nexus by, for the first time in the gasoline 
price asymmetry controversy, using a threshold PVECM and MCMC techniques in 
order to perform Bayesian inference. Using the relevant methodological framework, 
we have found strong evidence suggesting the validity of the “rockets and feathers” 
hypothesis. The oligopolistic structure of the local gasoline market triggers the price 
asymmetric adjustment path. This finding raises serious doubts about the existence of 
a rent seeking oligopolistic behavior by retailers. The difference in the existence of 
asymmetric pass-through suggests that empirical studies that ignore the role of a non 
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linear model may miss an important element of the nature of price adjustment in the 
retail gasoline industry thus providing the wrong signal to government officials and 
policymakers. Lastly, estimating the degree of competition in the gasoline industry is 
crucial for regulatory and competition authorities. Regulators would like to know 
whether current regulation is conducive to competition. Likewise, competition 
authorities might gauge the current competitive situation in the gasoline industry and 
thus implement the appropriate policies to prevent anti-competitive behaviour by the 
market players (i.e. petrol stations, refineries, oil companies).     
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the data and the 
structure of the gasoline market in the US. Section 3 introduces the empirical 
methodology. Section 4 presents the main hypotheses or conjectures that the empirical 
analysis tests. Section 5 discusses the econometric techniques, while Section 6 
compares our findings to previous work. Finally Section 7 concludes the paper and 
provides some policy implications.   
 
II.  DATA DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS 
 
Our empirical analysis is based on a panel dataset of 9888 monthly observations 
spanning the period from January 1994 to February 2011. We have to stress, however, 
that more recent data are not available since the retail and wholesale gasoline prices 
do not go beyond February 2011.  The sample includes 48 US states except for Maine 
and Connecticut where no data was available. The use of monthly data takes away 
much price variation and  higher frequency data would be more suitable for analyzing 
our research questions (Remer 2015) but  our main data source (Energy Information 
Administration -EIA) publishes only monthly and annually time series.   
Retail and wholesale (rack) motor gasoline prices before taxes and duties are 
obtained from the EIA of the U.S. Department of Energy. Spot prices of conventional 
gasoline (measured in dollars per gallon) traded in New York Harbor are taken also 
from the EIA. The reason for choosing New York Harbor instead of other hubs such 
as the U.S Gulf Coast is that the former constitutes the most significant logistic hub 
for refined gasoline both arriving by pipeline from the Gulf Coast and from abroad by 
tanker (Trench, 2001). Besides we have used other spot indicators such as The Gulf 
and the West Coast spot prices with similar empirical results. The cash price of bulk 
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unleaded gasoline delivered to New York Harbor represents a good proxy for the 
input cost since it is estimated that on average, 96% of the wholesale price is 
represented by the cost of gasoline at the hub (Douglas and Herrera, 2010). Crude oil 
price measured in dollars per barrel accounts for the Cushing, OK WTI Spot Price 
FOB, also extracted from EIA. Lastly, as suggested by Deltas (2008), we calculate the 
difference between the retail and wholesale price known as the profit margin, in order 
to capture the presence of market power.  
 
< Insert Table 2 about here > 
 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of our dataset. Over the sample period, 
retail prices averaged 1.4 dollars per gallon (not including taxes) while wholesale 
prices were approximately 16 cents lower (1.25). It is worth mentioning that retail and 
wholesale gasoline prices follow a similar pattern. Specifically, gasoline prices have 
been rising slightly over the examined period, with a drift of 0.10 cents per month. 
Regarding the short run price fluctuations, it is important to note that the standard 
deviation of retail prices is smaller than that of wholesale prices (0.144 and 0.146 
respectively) suggesting the existence of a “dampening” effect in the gasoline market 
(Deltas, 2008).  
Figure 1 depicts the relatively close co movement between the spot gasoline price 
and the level of wholesale and retail (pump) prices. Moreover, it is evident that 
gasoline prices were characterized by high volatility within the examined period. 
More specifically, the average retail gasoline prices (before taxes) in the US have 
shown an upward trend during the period from February 2002 until July 2008, 
reaching the highest level at 3.588 USD/gallon.  
This trend is fully reversed within the next period (August 2008-March 2009) 
in which retail prices have dropped significantly by 55% approximately. It is 
noteworthy that the wholesale (rack) prices of gasoline follow a similar pattern with 
smaller fluctuations. Examining the distribution of the size of the adjustment, we see 
that they were quite small in the period from January 1994 to February 2005 whereas 
became more volatile from 2005 onwards. The price of spot gasoline has followed a 
similar pattern. More specifically, within the same period, the spot price of gasoline 
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has fluctuated 205 times; 119(58%) adjustments were upward and 86 (42%) 
adjustments were downward. 
<Insert Figure 1 about here> 
 
ΙΙΙ.   ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
Our model extends the study of Greenwood-Nimmo and Shin (2013) to a panel data 
framework. Specifically, the model is as follows. Suppose we have an asymmetric 
long-run relationship of the form: 
 
it i it it it
y u ,  i 1,...,n,t 1,...,T           x α x α                           (1) 
where i  represents fixed effects, itx  is a 1k   vector of regressors, 
 tit ijj 1max ,0







 x x  are partial sum processes representing 
positive and negative changes respectively. We have the following conditional Panel 




it i ,t 1 i ,t 1 i ,t 1 j i ,t jj 1
q 1
j i ,t j j i ,t j itj 0
y y y
           e
   
   
    
 
         
    


δ x δ x
π x π x
                             (2) 
This is a minimal extension of the model in Greenwood-Nimmo and Shin (2013) and 
Shin, Yu, and Greenwood-Nimmo (2014). In the above asymmetric PVECM, changes 
in the input prices (crude oil and spot prices) are split into positive and negative 
changes, respectively. In other words, as suggested by Galeotti, et al (2003), short-run 
asymmetry is captured by similarly decomposing price changes into 
Δ 01  

ttt xxx  and Δ 01  

ttt xxx for x=CR, SPG. Hence ΔCRP = ΔCR if 
ΔCR>0 and 0 otherwise. ΔSPGP = ΔSPG if ΔSPG>0 and 0 otherwise. The opposite 
holds for ΔCRN, and ΔSPGN. Finally ECMP and ECMN denote the one-period 
lagged deviation from the long-run equilibrium and account for asymmetry in the 
adjustment process. Similarly ECMP = εt>0 and 0 otherwise and ECMN = εt<0 and 0 
otherwise.  
The specification in Eq. 2 is the most general form, admitting both long-run 
and short-run asymmetries. The null hypotheses of long-run symmetry can be 
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evaluated using a standard Wald test. Short-run symmetry restrictions can take either 
of the two following equations:  
 
j j
, j 0,...,q 1    π π ,                            (3) 
q 1 q 1
j jj 0 j 0
  
 
 π π                                                                        (4) 
These expressions can be tested using standard Wald tests (Greenwood-Nimmo and 
Shin (2013). For a more general specification, we assume that: (i) long-run and short-
run coefficients can be state-specific; (ii) there is an unknown threshold which defines 
the nonlinear relationship, and (iii) error terms can be cross-sectionally correlated. 
The extended model can be represented by the following short-run nonlinear ECM:  
 
   
    
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xx  ,  (6) 
are the modified partial sum processes, itm  represents the separating variable, the 
profit margin in our case, and  is the threshold value. In the model of Greenwood-
Nimmo and Shin (2013) the regressors are simply    tit ijj 1max ,0


  x x  and 
   tit ijj 1min ,0


  x x  so that partial sum processes have a known threshold of 
zero. In this study, the same regressors are included but, additionally, we investigate 
whether negative and positive price changes depend on exceeding a certain, unknown, 
profit margin λ. In other words, we enter the markup dummy variable if it exceeds an 
unknown λ representing the threshold value. As explained before, these procedures 
are based on non-standard asymptotic theory and specifically account for the 
estimation of an unknown threshold parameter in a data driven approach that 




,   
 = 










    
Suppose: 
 K
i i i i i ,j i ,j i ,j
, , ,( , j 1, ,p 1),( , , j 0, ,q 1)   
         
 
β δ δ π π   ,  
for 1, ,i n  . For the coefficients 
i




~ , ,i 1, ,nβ β Ω   .                                                 (7) 
For the error terms we assume:  
  
iid
i i1 iT T
, , ~ ,    ε 0 Σ  ,  
independently of all regressors and other stochastic elements of the model. Given the 
considerable amount of heterogeneity that we have allowed for, the assumption of a 
general covariance matrix, 
ij
,i, j 1, ,n    Σ   is, perhaps, excessive but we retain it 
for generality. The model can be written as a nonlinear VAR with regressors: 
 
   
    
p 1
it i ,j i ,t j i i ,t 1 i i ,t 1 i i ,t 1j 1
q 1
i,j i ,t j i ,j i ,t j itj 0
w w y
              
    
   
    
 
        
       


δ x δ x
π x π x
                            (8) 
from which we obtain:  
    p 1it i ,j i ,t j it i it it i itj 1w w


           z ξ x β ,                                 (9)  
 where 
i i i i ,j i ,j i ,j
, ,( , j 1, ,p 1),( , , j 0, ,q 1)   
       
 
ξ δ δ π π   , viz. all elements 
of 
i
β  except 
i
 .    
In a Bayesian treatment of the problem, we have to address the following issues: 
(i) The determination of lag orders p  and q  . 
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(ii) The determination of an informative prior for β  which, however, is not as high-
dimensional as unrestricted coefficients would be in a general Bayesian VAR. 
(iii) The determination of a prior for Σ  and Ω . 
(iv) The determination of a prior for the threshold parameter   and a computational 
strategy to implement Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) for full Bayesian 
inference.   
Problem (i) is relatively easy as we can implement model comparison via 
marginal likelihood and Bayes factors (see Appendix B and C). Regarding (ii) we can 
assume simply that Kβ 0  but (as part of problem (iii)) we have to choose a 
reasonable prior for Ω . Given the Cholesky decomposition 'Ω C C  and the unique 




c ~ 0,1 ,  j i,i 1, ,n      
For matrix Σ  we assume a single-factor model based on the point that we 
made above. Specifically:  
 
t t t
f ε φ v ,                                                          (10) 
where 
t t1 tn




t t 1 t t
f af e ,   e ~ 0, 1 a

   ,                                     (11) 
provided |a| 1 . The formulation guarantees that (in the stationary case) the expected 
value of 
t
f  is zero and its variance is equal to one. 
Additionally, we assume:  
iid
2 2
t n 1 n
~ ,diag , ,   v 0   and φ  is an 1n  
vector of factor loadings. As our prior opinion is that cross-sectional correlations are 
similar, and to avoid the proliferation of parameters, we assume: 
1 n
    . 
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t n 1 n
~ ,  diag , ,   v 0  .                                              (12) 
We enforce parsimony by assuming:  
    2 2 2 2 2 2i 1 1 1 1 2log | ~ log ,  ,  i 2, ,n,   log ~ a ,a        .               (13)  
We set 0.4 , 
1 2
a 3, a 0.1   .  The resulting prior for 1  averages 0.23 with a 
standard deviation of 0.034. The typical ratio 1/ , 1i i    averages 1.06 and its 95% 
credible (Bayes) interval is from 0.69 to 1.70. 
For   we assume a flat prior: 
    p  0 1     .                                                     (14) 
This can be used to assess the validity of posterior results as we do not impose 
restrictive assumptions on the behavior of the margin. For parameter a  in (14) we 
assume: 
  p(a) 1 a 1    .                                                     (15) 
For model selection (values of p and q) we rely on the computation and comparison of 
marginal likelihoods and Bayes’ factors. The Bayes factors are computed using 
marginal likelihoods for threshold PVECM models (see Appendix C, D and E). We 
normalize the Bayes factor to 1 for 2, 1 p q , the simplest possible model in our 
context. Suppose  denotes the available data and   DR is the vector of 
parameters. For any posterior distribution whose kernel1 is: 
 p | ( ; )p( )     ,                                                (16) 
where ( ; )  is the likelihood function and ( )p   is the prior, the marginal 
likelihood can be expressed as: 
( ) ( ; )p( )d    M .                                                   (17) 
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The posterior itself is: 
   ( ; )p( ) ( ; )p( )p |
( )( ; )p( )d









.                                    (18) 
Similarly, we can define the marginal likelihood: 
1:t 1:t
( ) ( ; )p( )d    M ,                                                 (19) 
for data 1: t  from period 1up to t . Relative to a base model whose marginal likelihood 












 .                                                         (20) 
For details of computation see Appendix A and C. Here, we use the entire-
sample version of the Bayes factor (that is, we use t T ) and recursive Bayes factors 
will be used in the next section to compare with a model that does not allow for 
threshold effects. Based on the results of Table 3, we select a model with 3p  and 
2q   which is strongly favored over the other alternatives. 
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
IV.   FORMULATION OF RESEARCH HYPOTHESES  
In this section we develop the main research hypotheses regarding the 
existence of an asymmetric price adjustment mechanism in the wholesale and retail 
market segment, which are then tested empirically in the subsequent section of the 
paper.  
A widely used classification among studies that analyse the relationship 
between output and input gasoline prices is between short-run and long-run 
asymmetries. A short run analysis is suitable to compare the intensity of output price 
variations to positive or negative changes in input cost prices (i.e. crude oil price and 
spot gasoline price variations), while a long run analysis is needed if the empirical 
investigation focuses on the estimation and length of price fluctuations, as well as the 
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speed of adjustment toward an equilibrium level (Frey and Manera, 2007). In this 
study, by using a PVECM, we will decompose the wholesale and retail price 
fluctuations to long-run and short-run relationships while investigating for possible 
asymmetries in the adjustment process. Instead of using a typical ECM procedure 
where all variables are expressed in first differences, except for the stationary 
residuals that represent the Error Correction Term (ECT), indicating the deviations 
from the long-run equilibrium (speed of adjustment), we use a PVECM that is a 
system of equations allowing for decomposing short-run and long run asymmetric 
responses of gasoline prices to its input cost disturbances in a more efficient way (see 
for example Greenwood-Nimmo and Shin, 2013).   
As discussed above, one of the novelties of this paper is to split the sample 
allowing for different regimes determined by a threshold variable. This variable refers 
to the gross profit margin of the retailers, which is  a good proxy for market power  
(Deltas, 2008) In that case states will be sorted according to their prevailing 
“attitudes” towards competition placing them into competitive (low margin states) and 
non-competitive (high margin states) ones. Hence we will try to investigate if there is 
a link between the level of market power (or competition) and the asymmetric 
adjustment mechanism. Lastly, one of the main research questions that we want to 
examine is the dynamic gasoline price adjustment mechanism to innovations (shocks) 
caused by fluctuations of the input cost prices (i.e crude oil price and spot gasoline 
price). In this way, we trace out the duration of an exogenous shock to be either 
permanent or transitory.     
Based on the above, we formulate the following research hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1. The effects of upstream price increases are larger than those of price 
decreases in the wholesale and retail segment (long-run asymmetry).  
Hypothesis 2. The positive ECTs are larger than the negative ones in the wholesale 
and retail segment. Alternatively, the speed of adjustment toward long-run 
equilibrium is larger to positive than to negative fluctuations (long-run asymmetry).    
 
Hypothesis 3. The positive short-run price effect is larger than its negative 




Hypothesis 4. States with high (low) profit margin experience a slower (faster) 
adjustment to input price cost shocks (dynamic price adjustment).  
 
Hypothesis 5.  The impact of an input price shock to the transmission mechanism of 
the wholesale and retail gasoline price is permanent or transitory.   
 
V.   EMPIRICAL FINDINGS  
1.  Estimated coefficients. 
Table 4 depicts the empirical findings. We present results for four threshold PVECM 
which capture the (asymmetric) transmission of spot gasoline and crude oil price 
changes to both the pre-tax wholesale and retail gasoline prices respectively. In the 
relevant table, Panel A depicts the gasoline price adjustment to fluctuations in the spot 
gasoline price, while Panel B, represents the estimated coefficients of the threshold 
PVECM when the input cost variable is the crude oil price.       
Examining Panel A, it is evident that in both models (wholesale and retail) 
positive coefficients are larger, in absolute value, than their negative counterparts. 
This finding which is also evident in other empirical studies (Grosso and Manera 
2007; Contin et al. 2006; Polemis, 2012) reflects the consumers’ perception of the 
actual effects of oil price variations on gasoline price changes, meaning that the 
effects of upstream price increases are larger than those of price decreases. The 
coefficients ρ+ and ρ- indicate the asymmetric adjustment speed, which is a measure 
of long-run asymmetry (Polemis, 2012). In other words, the positive and negative 
error correction terms are associated with adjustment to the long-run equilibrium level 
of price from above and from below (Galeotti et al, 2003).  
From the reported values, we argue that the speed of adjustment in Model 1 
ranges from 42-57% per month. It is worth mentioning that, positive changes of the 
error correction term are larger, in absolute value, than their negative counterparts 
(0.571 and 0.421 respectively). This means that if the wholesale price of gasoline is 
10% above its long-run equilibrium price, given the current spot price, the percentage 
change difference over a period of one month will be 0.10 × (−0.571) = −0.0571 or 
5.7%. In other words, if we are off the long-run equilibrium, the wholesale (rack) 
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gasoline price will reach equilibrium in a six month period approximately. the speed 
of adjustment in the retail market model follows a similar trend . Specifically, the 
positive change of the ECM to the long-run equilibrium is estimated to −0.638. This 
means that if the retail price of gasoline is 10% above its long-run equilibrium price, 
given the current spot price, 6.4% of the difference between the equilibrium price and 
the current price will be eliminated in the next month ceteris paribus. 
Moreover, we find a positive (β+) and negative (β-) long-run coefficient equal 
to 0.92 and 0.87 respectively, indicating that wholesalers are driven by the 
fluctuations in the input price of gasoline in the long run. This result reveals a long-
run rent-seeking oligopolistic behaviour by the oil companies, which in turns is 
consistent with an asymmetric gasoline price adjustment mechanism at least in the 
long run.  
In addition, the empirical findings indicate that positive short-run price effect 
is larger than its negative counterpart (0.313 instead of 0.236). This means that 
wholesale gasoline prices in the US seem to react more to price increases than to price 
decreases. This finding can be traced in many European countries as well2. From the 
magnitude of the relevant estimates, we see that a 10% short-run increase in spot price 
of gasoline (input price) will increase the wholesale price of gasoline by about 3.1%.  
< Insert Table 4 about here > 
The discussion now turns to Model 2. Column 2, shows where the responsiveness of 
retail price is symmetric in decreases and increases of the spot price of gasoline. More 
specifically, an increase in the spot price of gasoline of one unit induces a 
contemporaneous retail price increase of about 0.44, whereas a fall in spot price of 
one unit, results in a contemporaneous price effect of 0.38. Taken together, this means 
that the price responded more rapidly to cost increases than to decreases. From the 
above analysis, it is evident that the short-run accumulated pass-through in the retail 
price of gasoline is asymmetric. This result reveals long-run rent-seeking oligopolistic 
pricing behaviour by the retailers giving strong evidence that asymmetric price 
adjustment can be attributed to the oligopolistic pricing behavior (Radchenko, 2005). 
Specifically, the increasingly short-run rate of response of retail price of gasoline to 
input cost (wholesale price), gives an indication that a market power effect stemming 
from the wholesalers to retailers prevails in the oil supply chain. This can be 
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explained by the fact that, the US oil industry is dominated by large, multinational 
companies (BP, Exxon-Mobil, Texaco, Shell, etc). The oligopolistic structure of the 
oil market and the market power of oil companies (Verlinda, 2008), which has been 
reinforced by the low search intensity of final consumers (see among others Lewis, 
2011, Deltas, 2008 and Johnson, 2002) have lead to asymmetric price adjustments in 
the oil market and high profit margins for the oil companies. 
Lastly, if we try to compare the two-market segments (wholesale and retail), 
some striking features emerge. First, the magnitude of short-run coefficients is in the 
most cases larger in the retail than in the wholesale level. This means that, on the one 
hand, retailers do immediately transfer onto final prices (pump prices) all the 
adjustments in the spot gasoline prices. On the other hand, in the wholesale segment, 
oil companies tend to distribute changes over time. Second, the adjustment towards 
the equilibrium level is more gradual in the wholesale level revealing the differences 
between the two market segments. Furthermore, both the wholesalers and retailers 
tend to react more to price increases than price decreases. Lastly, the point estimates 
of the single threshold for the two models are also reported in the relevant table. More 
specifically, the estimates are very close ranging from 0.142 (Model 1) to 0.137 
(Model 2). Thus the estimates indicate the existence of two regimes (low and high 
market power).  
The existence of price asymmetry both in the wholesale and retail segment is 
also evident in Figure 2a. The latter provides finite-sample evidence about the 
parameters shown, ρ+, ρ-, δ and the threshold mark-up λ. The solid line is the 
posterior density of wholesale price, while the dashed line plots the distribution of 
retail gasoline price respectively. Most marginal posteriors deviate markedly from 
normal distribution. In other words, the gasoline price adjustment pattern to 
fluctuations in the spot price of gasoline in both market segments is far from 
symmetric.  
 
<Insert Figure 2a about here> 
Similarly, we find significant evidence of additively asymmetric dynamic 
adjustment to crude oil price fluctuations. It is evident from the following figure that 
marginal posteriors deviate significantly from the shape of normal distribution in both 
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market segments. These results indicate that a crude oil price increase is passed 
through more forcefully than a price decrease supporting the “rockets and feathers” 
hypothesis.   
<Insert Figure 2b about here> 
Although the above analysis reveals that there are short run relationships between the 
variables of each gasoline price adjustment model (wholesale and retail), it does not 
reveal the direction of their causal relationship (Kilian and Park, 2009). An alternative 
way to obtain the information regarding the relationships among the variables of the 
two relevant models is through the estimation of the Posterior Generalized Impulse 
Response Functions (PGIRFs) along the lines of Koop, Pesaran and Potter (1996) and 
Pesaran and Shin (1998). Our strategy is to compute the PGIRF for each MCMC draw 
and then average across draws (after convergence) to obtain a final measure, in order 
to account for parameter uncertainty.  
The upper panel of Figure 3a shows the PGIRFs of the wholesale gasoline 
price to the transmission of shocks of the input cost variable (spot gasoline price). 
This figure shows the typical speed of response to a cost increase and a cost decrease 
and underscores the point that the responses of wholesale gasoline price may differ 
substantially, depending on the time period of the spot price increases. Specifically, it 
is evident that the effect of one standard deviation shock of the spot price of gasoline 
on wholesale price of gasoline is positive and significant for a limited amount of time 
(one month period after the shock). Subsequently, the graph shows that an increase in 
the spot price of gasoline,e all else equal, would cause a transitory downward trend 
within the next month which stabilizes thereafter. Lastly, the peak response of 
wholesale price to spot price innovations occurs one month after the initial shock and 
is estimated to be approximately 8%.  
 
<Insert Figure 3a about here> 
We now turn our attention to the examination of PGIRFs at the retail level 
segment (lower panel of Figure 3a). If we look carefully the relevant diagram, we 
observe that similar findings as. the response is also found to be positive and 
statistically significant one month after the shock. The cumulative effect reaches 
10.0% in the first month, and then returns toward zero after the end of the second 
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month. However, the increasing trend stops within the next month of the peak 
response. Subsequently, the PGIRF of the retail price to a 10% increase in the spot 
price of gasoline is stable across the rest of the simulated period (8 months). This 
representation provides a solid illustration of an asymmetric gasoline price response 
in the US retail market segment.  
If we try to compare the PGIRFs between the two gasoline models, some 
important results emerge. First, the response of retail gasoline price to one standard 
deviation shock of the input price (spot price of gasoline) is more abrupt than the 
wholesale response since the relevant increase within a limited short run time span 
(one month) is estimated to 10% instead of 8% respectively. However, both series 
exhibit a decreasing trend after one month period stabilising thereafter. This finding 
reveals the absence of a sluggish adjustment price mechanism, which is often 
considered indicative of weak competition and significant market power (SMP) by the 
incumbents. Moreover, an oil shock in both models is short-lived. Specifically, the 
rate of response of wholesale (retail) price of gasoline to input price shocks, gives an 
indication that a market power effect stemming from the refiners to wholesalers 
(retailers) prevails in the wholesale gasoline price changes.  
Finally, we turn our attention to the investigation of the response of 
downstream gasoline prices at the two stage level regime to upstream shocks in the 
spot gasoline price. Figure 3b illustrates that gasoline market specific demand shocks, 
such as shocks to input cost price, will generate a significantly negative relationship 
between wholesale/retail gasoline price adjustments and spot gasoline price. 
Regarding Model 1 (upper panel)   a strong and negative rapid reaction of gasoline 
price to a 10% spot price decrease in the short-run. Similarly to Kilian and Park 
(2009), the peak response occurs one month after the shock and is estimated at 8%, 
revealing an incomplete pass-trough of wholesale gasoline price to the spot price 
decreases.  
The response of retail gasoline price to a 10% spot price decrease is also found 
to be negative and statistically significant one month after the shock, reaching a peak 
at 5%. From the combined investigation of the two figures, it appears that the peak 
response of the PGIRFs to a cost price decrease is lower in absolute terms than its 
relevant increase. This finding provides a solid illustration of an asymmetric gasoline 
price response in the US retail market segment.   
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<Insert Figure 3b about here> 
Since we use a random-coefficient model, it is possible to compute GIRFs for states 
with margin above and below the threshold (λ). In both cases the median PGIRF is 
used for the corresponding states and  the posterior standard deviations of these 
functions of interest monitor. The results are presented in Figures 4a and 4b. These 
figures plot the responses for two states (high and low profit margin) in each market 
segment (wholesale and retail). Figures 4a and 4b depict the responses of the two 
states: one with a high profit margin of 14.2 cents and one with a margin of 13.7 cents 
per gallon. The red dotted lines represent the 95% Bayes probability intervals 
computed by MCMC.  
<Insert Figure 4a about here> 
 
By comparing the two relevant figures, some important findings emerge. First, 
high margin states have faster wholesale and retail price responses to spot gasoline 
price changes than states with low margins. Second, in a state that exceeds the 
threshold value (14.2 and 13.7 cent margin in both market segments), wholesale 
(retail) prices will reflect 9% (10%) of a change in the spot gasoline price fluctuations 
within the first month. If a state falls under the threshold parameter, the corresponding 
figures are estimated as 7% and 8%, respectively.  
Lastly, similar to Deltas (2008), the degree of asymmetry varies systematically 
across states, especially in the first month after the shock, and is more pronounced in 
the high margin states. By the end of the second month, the gasoline price adjustment 
to increases and decreases of the input cost shocks does not appear to vary 
significantly, revealing that there is a symmetric response in the high and low margin 
states. However, a cost decrease produces mixed results in the low margin states for 
the direction of price responses in the two market segments after the first five months. 
More specifically, the wholesale gasoline price response to input cost decreases has 
surprisingly a positive but not statistically significant interaction effect. The reverse 
holds in the retail market segment. The above findings strengthen the notion that 
market power proxied by the level of gross profit margins appears to affect the extent 
to which it responds asymmetrically to cost increases and decreases. 
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<Insert Figure 4b about here> 
2.  Structural breaks 
The previous estimates reveal strong evidence of asymmetric adjustment in the retail 
and wholesale gasoline prices. As a further sensitivity test, we account for the 
possibility of structural breaks in the threshold parameter λ (gross profit margin). 
Specifically, the possibility that the margin changed abruptly during the examined 
period cannot be excluded a priori since exogenous shocks such as the U.S invasion to 
Iraq (March –May 2003), and the two main Hurricanes (Katrina and Rita) that hit the 
U.S (August 2005 and September 2005 respectively) may have left a significant mark 
on the oil sector.  
This analysis is also motivated by previous studies (Lewis, 2009, Sen et al, 
2011), which suggest that retail price asymmetries became sharper in some U.S. states 
in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. , Retail prices in some states remained at high 
levels for a considerable time period after the Hurricane, despite a gradual decline in 
wholesale prices from post Katrina levels. The sharp increase in retail gasoline prices 
has resulted in public concerns of “price gouging” by vertically integrated refiners 
and initiated several antitrust government investigations3. As noted by Sen et al. 
(2011), a possible theoretical explanation for sharper retail asymmetries observed 
post-Katrina could be because the occurrence of the Hurricane resulted in a uniform 
cost shock on prices which served as focal points for tacit collusion, allowing oil 
companies to better coordinate, and sustain price-fixing agreements that hinder 
competition.  
We allow for the possibility of an unknown number of breaks in the threshold 
parameter and use the Particle Filter suggested by He and Maheu, (2010) to compute 
the marginal likelihood and make inferences about the structural parameters of the 
model4. Apart from the two hurricane dummies e already in the model along with a 
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where   t 1,...,T   without excluding the possibility that * 0t t , t t   . To search 
systematically for the possibility of breaks we use the stochastic search variable 
selection (SSVS) method developed by George et al, (2008) and Jochmann, et al, 
(2010). The SSVS involves a specific prior of the form:  
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The prior implies a mixture of two normals:  
                                         γ j δ j ~      2120 ,0,01 jjJj NN     (25) 
If 0 j  is “small” and 1 j  is “large”, then, when 0j  chances are that variable j will 
be excluded from the model while if 1j  chances are that variable j will be 
included in the model.  
The prior for the indicator parameter   is:  
                                                      jjjj qPqP  1)0(,)1(     (26) 
and we set 12jq . For 0 j  and 1 j , George, Sun and Ni (2008) propose a semi-
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101 c and )(ˆ ju  is any preliminary estimate of the variance of  j . We set the 
preliminary estimate to the one obtained by nonlinear LS allowing for a simple 
constant threshold. For the threshold parameters, we set the preliminary estimate of 
the variance to 0.20. The results were reasonably robust to this choice.   
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Based on this model, we compute the Recursive Bayes factors for different number of 
Breaks ( B ). The results are shown in Figure 5. The break in the data is inconclusive 
for B=1 while for B 2  the evidence against breaks is considerable. This evidence 
leaves little doubt that the threshold model captures the variation adequately and 
leaves no possibility for structural breaks in the parameters of the model. 
<Insert Figure 5 about here> 
3.  Robustness check 
ITthis subsection examines whether our conclusions are robust to alternative data and 
model specifications. The results are summarized in Table 3 (Panel B) and Figure 2b.  
In the first stage we estimate a new threshold PVECM and perform MCMC 
Bayesian techniques using crude oil price changes as the input cost variable affecting 
the wholesale and retail gasoline price adjustment respectively. It is well documented 
in the literature that this marker captures real oil price shocks driven solely by supply-
side disruptions in the crude oil market (Chang, and Hwang, 2015; Greenwood-
Nimmo and Shin, 2013, Honarvar, 2009, Deltas, 2008). Our results are generally 
robust to this alternative measure of oil price shocks. Specifically, the estimated 
positive coefficients in the wholesale and retail segment of the gasoline market are 
larger, in absolute value, than their negative counterparts leaving no doubt for the 
existence of an asymmetric adjustment price path (see Table 2 -Panel B). It is worth 
emphasising that the absolute magnitude of the estimated coefficients in this case is in 
general terms larger than the previous model. This finding shows that the response of 
gasoline prices in the downstream market (wholesale and retail segment) to crude oil 
price fluctuations is instantaneous.  
Figure 2b shows the marginal posterior densities for selected parameters 
accounting for the speed of adjustment (ρ+, ρ-), symmetry testing (δ) and lastly the 
threshold mark-up variable (λ) in the presence of crude oil price fluctuations. The 
posteriors are non-normal and, therefore, relying on asymptotic theory would be 
dangerous in this instance. 
Another useful insight is obtained by comparing the proposed model with the 
model of Greenwood-Nimmo and Shin (2013) – employing the same prior- for the 
common coefficients. The models can be compared in terms of their marginal 
likelihoods or their ratio, the Bayes factor. The results are provided in Figure 6. All 
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our empirical work uses 250,000 MCMC iterations the first 50,000 of which are 
discarded to mitigate the impact of startup effects. Convergence is assessed using 
Geweke’s (1992) diagnostic and relative numerical efficiency as well as numerical 
standard errors are monitored.5 It is evident that both models behave equally well 
before about 1999, when the model proposed here has a Bayes factor ranging from 
20:1 to 40:1, until 2006 when it jumps to over 120 reaching a maximum of 160:1 near 
2009. The Bayes factor remains well over 100 in the subsequent period. 
<Insert Figure 6 about here> 
 
VI.   RESULT DISCUSSIONS  
To contextualize these findings, we draw comparisons with Deltas (2008), a study 
which linearly evaluates the effects of market structure through interacting lagged 
wholesale and retail price changes with state specific margins. Deltas (2008) finds 
coefficient estimates of response differences for wholesale price changes to be 
positive, indicating a faster response to price increases than decreases, indicating 
retail price asymmetry. His results also reveal that both the speed of adjustment and 
the degree of asymmetry depend on the average retail-wholesale margin of a state. He 
claims that states with large average profit margins tend to have more asymmetric and 
slower adjustment than states with small margins. Our empirical findings are in 
alignment with the aforementioned study revealing an asymmetric response of 
gasoline price to crude oil and spot price fluctuations.  
 
Deltas (2008) did not split the sample into high and low margin states by using a 
threshold analysis and allow for dynamic interactions of wholesale and retail gasoline 
price to input cost shocks (e.g. crude oil price). Instead following the specifications of 
Borenstein and Shepard, 1996, Borenstein et al, (1997) and lastly Lewis, (2003), he 
used a linear lag adjustment model with an error correction term in order to 
investigate wholesale and retail price asymmetries. As described above, a linear ECM 
suffers from estimation uncertainty or errors arising from the estimation of the long 
run cointegrating relationship (Greenwood-Nimmo and Shin, 2013). In this study this 
limitation is addressed by the estimation of a threshold PVECM and subsequent 
PGIRFs that to assess the timing and magnitude of the responses to one time demand 
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or supply shocks in the spot gasoline market (Kilian and Park, 2009). Lastly, by using 
a threshold (sample splitting) PVECM, we treated all our variables as endogenous 
with the inclusion of an exogenous threshold variable in contrast to the above study 
which required that all right-hand-side variables are strictly exogenous.   
Another study that discusses estimates from nonlinear ARDL (NARDL) 
models is the study of Greenwood-Nimmo and Shin (2013), the first attempt in the 
literature to perform a non-linear approximation for the investigation of “rockets and 
feathers” hypothesis effect in four fuel markets in the UK following changes in the 
price of crude oil. They find significant evidence that the retail price of unleaded 
petrol before taxes and duties adjusts symmetrically to fluctuations to crude oil. 
However, this outcome is fully reversed once one accounts for the taxation effect 
(excise and value-added tax), raising the possibility that firms can use the tax system 
to conceal rent-seeking behaviour.  
The above study finds that the speed of adjustment (ρ) is estimated at 37% per 
month, indicating a sluggish adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium. This means 
that if the retail gasoline price is 10% above its long-run equilibrium price, given the 
current crude oil price, the percentage change difference over a period of 1 month will 
be 3.7%. In other words, if we are off the long-run equilibrium, the retail gasoline 
price will reach equilibrium in a four month period approximately. This finding is 
consistent with non-transitory periods of mispricing in the UK gasoline industry, 
revealing a weak competition among the market players (e.g. oil companies, retailers, 
hypermarkets, etc). Our study (see Table 2, column 4) claims that the speed of 
adjustment to the long-run equilibrium is larger in its impact ranging from 52-67% 
per month with larger positive changes of the error correction term (in absolute terms) 
than its negative counterpart. The difference between the magnitude of the speed of 
adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium reflects the dissimilar conditions that 
face the UK and the U.S. in their gasoline industry in terms of market structure (e.g. 
concentration level, level of vertical integration, barriers to entry, etc) and competitive 
behaviour among the marketers.      
Regarding the dynamic responses of gasoline price to crude oil fluctuations 
simulated over a short-run time horizon, the study of Greenwood-Nimmo and Shin 
(2013) argues that there is a strong and rapid reaction to positive changes but a more 
gradual response to negative changes. They claim that positive crude oil shocks will 
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generate a significantly positive effect in the retail price of gasoline. That effect 
(nearly 10%) starts on impact and reaches a peak in the first month after the shock. 
Similarly, we also find that the response of retail price to spot price fluctuations is  
positive and statistically significant one month after the shock, reaching a peak at 10% 
approximately. Contrary to our findings, the previous study estimates the peak 
response of retail gasoline price to a 10% negative crude oil price shock to 9% 
approximately. Similarly to our study,  however, the peak response occurs one month 
after the shock and is short-lived. The positive discrepancy between the difference of 
positive and negative values to crude oil fluctuations is also evident in the 
aforementioned study providing a stark illustration of an asymmetric gasoline price 
response.   
Similarly, Lewis and Noel, (2011) argue that in the U.S, it takes three weeks 
following a cost increase for retail prices to fully adjust to the long-run equilibrium 
level. The speed of adjustment to negative cost shocks is much slower since it takes 
nearly six weeks to approach full pass-through, suggesting an asymmetric gasoline 
price adjustment in the U.S cities. Specifically, a cost increase (decrease) is fully 
passed through to the retail price in almost five (seven) days, highlighting that these 
responses are short-lived.  
From the exposition of related evidence from various strands of empirical 
literature, it is safe to conclude that the magnitude of our estimated coefficients is 
reasonable and comparable to prior studies  revealing the relative importance of local 
market power in a coherent way.  
VII.   CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper, we revisit the “rockets and feathers” hypothesis in the US wholesale 
and retail gasoline market segments by proposing a panel approach which allows for 
asymmetry, threshold effects, and optimal lag selection based on Markov Chain 
Monte Carlo Bayesian techniques. In order to empirically test our research 
hypotheses, we develop a new empirical methodology based on nonlinear threshold 
PVECMs and propose MCMC techniques to perform Bayesian inference in order to 
account for the investigation of gasoline price asymmetry. In doing so, we develop 
new econometric techniques for multivariate non-linear threshold error correction 
models accounting for wholesale and retail gasoline price responses respectively.  
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The motivation of this paper is to contribute to the empirical literature on retail 
and wholesale gasoline price asymmetry nexus by using for the first time in the 
gasoline price asymmetry controversy, a threshold PVECM and MCMC techniques in 
order to perform Bayesian inference with the following novelties. First, we allow for 
random coefficients in the Bayesian PVECM. Second, we account for cross-sectional 
dependence. Third, instead of the standard Gibbs sampler, we use a Langevin 
diffusion sampler which can deal effectively with autocorrelation and the non-
standard form of priors for the covariance matrices. Fourth, we propose new 
techniques in the conditional posterior sampling of the threshold parameter. Lastly, 
we account for model comparison with a standard model that does not allow 
thresholds by estimating recursive Bayes factors using the particle filtering 
methodology 
We examine differences between downstream and upstream gasoline markets, 
as we evaluate possible asymmetries in retail price adjustment to wholesale price 
shocks as well as the relationship between wholesale prices and spot price of gasoline 
shocks. We also attempt to evaluate the possible impacts of retail market power on the 
transmission of wholesale prices, and its potential effect on asymmetries in retail price 
adjustment. This is important, as very few studies have attempted to assess the effects 
of state specific market structure.  
In this respect, we focus on trends in retail and wholesale monthly gasoline 
prices in 48 U.S states over the period January 1994 to February 2011. Following 
Deltas (2008), we proxy the effects of market power through state specific gross profit 
margins. Our empirical findings suggest that there is a single threshold in all of the 
regression relationships, splitting the sample into two parts (high and low profit 
margin states). In addition, the econometric analysis support the notion that market 
power does result in behaviour that leads to higher retail prices, and potentially more 
profits. However, this is to be expected in oligopolistic markets and does not 
necessarily imply the existence of collusive behaviour. With respect to upstream 
markets, we do find evidence that wholesale prices respond asymmetrically to 
increases and decreases in spot gasoline price fluctuations. In order to sharpen the 
robustness of our results, we have addressed the impact of crude oil price changes on 
the wholesale and retail gasoline price adjustment. Our results are remarkably 
consistent and robust to this alternative measure of oil price shocks. In other words, 
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our findings for the effects of oil price shocks do not conflict with the conventional 
view that an oil price increase has a larger output effect than an oil price decrease 
indicating an asymmetric price adjustment path downstream (wholesale and retail 
segment).  
Our analysis implies that, states with high profit margin experience a slower 
adjustment and a more asymmetric response compared to low profit ones thus leading 
to the validity of Hypothesis 4. Moreover, the magnitude of the estimated short-run 
coefficients is in the most cases larger in the retail than in the wholesale level. 
However, the adjustment towards the equilibrium level is more gradual in the 
wholesale segment whereas both the wholesalers and retailers tend to react more to 
price increases than price decreases. In contrast to other studies (e.g Greenwood-
Nimmo and Shin, 2013), we find significant evidence that the price of gasoline before 
taxes and duties in the wholesale and retail segment adjusts more rapidly in an upward 
than a downward direction of the input price shocks. This implies also the validity of 
Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3. Lastly, the sign of the difference between the positive and the 
negative values of wholesale and retail gasoline prices to input cost shocks gives 
further support of an asymmetric response in both market segments  
Finally, our analysis claims that the traditional approach to studying 
asymmetric gasoline price adjustment must be rethought. An immediate implication 
of our analysis is that future researchers have to move beyond empirical models that 
treat regression functions as identical across all sample observations. Relaxing this 
counterfactual ceteris paribus assumption allows the individual observations to be 
divided into classes based on the value of an unobserved variable, which in our case is 
the level of local competition in the industry proxied by the gross profit margin. With 
this approach, panel cross section elements (states/cities, etc.) are sorted according to 






1. “Kernel” means that the normalizing constant is omitted. In most circumstances 
this is because it is not available in closed form. 
 
 
2. For an extensive review  of price asymmetry in the European Union see, among 
others, the study of Polemis and Fotis (2014). 
 
 
3. See, for example, “FTC Releases Report on its Investigation of Gasoline Price 





4. We implement this filter using 216 particles. From 10 different runs the root mean 
square error of difference in posterior means was 10-5. As a robustness check we 




5. We use AR(10) processes fitted to the MCMC draws to compute the required 
long-run variance, the spectral density at zero. 
 
 
6. This guarantees the existence of moments up to order four. 
 
 
7. See also Poyiadjis et al. (2011). 
 
 
8. The benefit of MALA over Random-Walk-Metropolis arises when the number of 
parameters n  is large. This happens because the scaling parameter λ is 1 2( ) O n for 
Random-Walk-Metropolis but it is 1 6( ) O n  for MALA, see Roberts et al. (1997) 





Appendix A Computational strategy 
 
We have a (large) Bayesian PVECM whose dimension is equal to n , the number of 
U.S. states. Without the random-coefficient specification, estimation of this VAR 
would present considerable challenges. For a given value of  , MCMC analysis can 
be easily implemented using standard techniques involving the Gibbs sampler. Let us 
write the PVECM in the following form: 
    p 1t j t j t t t tj 1


     w Γ w Z ξ ε X β ε   
The VAR can be written as  
  i i i i ,  i 1, ,n   w X β ε    
Making the substitution  
iid
i i i K
,  ~ ,   β β η η 0 Ω  we obtain: 
  i i i  w X β e   











































  so that the PVECM 
can be represented as: 
    w X β e   
and          n T
       ee X Ω I X Σ I V .  The likelihood function is 




; , exp ( ) ( )
  
        
 
θ w X V w X β V w X β  
and the posterior can be obtained from Bayes’ theorem: 
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      p | ; , pθ θ w X θ    
where ,   w X  denotes the data. 
As we can see, the posterior is a complicated function of the threshold 
parameter,  . The parameters θ  consists of , , ,β Σ Ω . It is useful to condition on the 
threshold parameter and define the conditional posterior: 
        p | p | , ; p |   θ θ θ θ     
where    ; ; ,  θ θ    is the conditional likelihood and  p |θ  is the 
conditional prior. The dimensionality of the parameter vector, despite the fact that we 
have a Bayesian VAR is small as there are K   elements in β , ( 1)2
K K  different 
elements in Ω  and we have a single-factor model for the cross-sectional covariance 
matrix Σ .  
For given    the posterior can be analyzed easily using the methods that we 
explain below. MCMC draws for  are realized using a Metropolis-Hastings 
algorithm. Suppose we are currently at state s  and the draw is ( )s  . The new draw 
( 1)s   is realized as follows. Suppose we have a candidate draw c  from a 






p | , / g( )
min 1,  
p | , / g( )
   
 






otherwise we set (s 1) (s)   . Our candidate generating density is crafted numerically 
as follows. Given a grid of values  1 G, ,    we compute the marginal 
likelihood of the model. Suppose these values are , g g M . Our candidate 
generating density is based on a piecewise linear approximation to the obtained values 
of log marginal likelihoods. We do not need the normalizing constant in this 





























 θ θ ,   S1 (s) (s)s 1 ˆ ˆS    

  C θ θ θ θ ,  and 
 (s) ,s 1, ,S θ   represents the MCMC draws for the parameters for a given value of 
 . The denominator is based on a normal approximation to the posterior  p |θ   at 
the point ˆ
 
θ θ . The candidate generating density has been found an excellent 
approximation to the marginal posterior distribution  p |  . See Figure A1. 
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Figure A1. Marginal posterior and candidate generating densities 
 
The candidate generating function is a spline approximation to 20G   points equally 
spaced between the 10% and 90% percentiles of the empirical distribution of profit 
margins across all U.S. states and all time periods. 
 
To implement this procedure we use 20G   points equally spaced between 
the 10% and 90% percentiles of the empirical distribution of profit margins across all 
U.S. states and all time periods. In our application, this choice worked quite well. 
We deviate from standard practice that uses the Gibbs sampler in the context 
of Bayesian VAR models. Part of the problem, is that the priors on the different 
element of Σ  and Ω  are non-standard. Our procedure is based on the Langevin 
Diffusion MCMC methods proposed by Girolami and Calderhead (2011). As matrix 
Σ  is not available in closed form we do have to update the common factor 
t
f  via a 
separate MCMC step.  The set of common factor values is jointly updated using, 
again, a Girolami and Calderhead (2011) MCMC update. 
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Appendix B Markov chain Monte Carlo 
Following Girolami and Calderhead (2011) we utilize Metropolis-adjusted Langevin 
and Hamiltonian Monte Carlo sampling methods defined on the Riemann manifold, 
since we are sampling from target densities with high dimensions that exhibit strong 
degrees of correlation.  Consider the Langevin diffusion: 
      12 log ;d t p t dt d t  θ θ B , 
where B  denotes the D-dimensional Brownian motion. The first-order Euler 
discretization provides the following candidate generation mechanism: 
 * 212 log ;o op    θ θ θ z , 
where  ~ ,Dz 0 I , and 0   is the integration step size. Since the discretization 
induces an unavoidable error in approximation of the posterior, a Metropolis step is 
used, where the proposal density is  
    * 2 212| log ; ,    o o oDq p θ θ θ θ I  , 
 with acceptance probability  
   






















 denotes the available data. The Brownian motion of the Riemann manifold is given 
by: 
               










           
B G θ G θ G θ G θ B
θ
 ,  
for 1,...,i D . 
         The discrete form of the above stochastic differential equations is: 
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θ θ G θ θ G θ G θ
θ
G θ
G θ G θ G θ z
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The proposal density is     * 2 1| ~ , ,  o o od  θ θ μ θ G θ  and the acceptance 
probability has the standard Metropolis form:  
 
   






















The gradient and the Hessian are computed using analytic derivatives provided by 
computer algebra software. All computations are performed in Fortran 77 making 
extensive use of IMSL subroutines. 
The numerical performance, in terms of autocorrelation functions, is presented 
in Figure A2. The Metropolis-Hastings procedure we use is a simple random walk 
whose candidate generating density is a multivariate Student-t distribution with 5 
degrees of freedom6 and covariance equal to a scaled version of the covariance 
obtained from the Langevin Diffusion MCMC. The scale parameter is adjusted so that 
approximately 25% of the draws are accepted. The performance of Langevin 








Appendix C Marginal likelihood and Bayes factors 
For any posterior distribution whose kernel is  | ( ; ) ( ) p p    the marginal 
likelihood can be expressed as ( ) ( ; ) ( )   p d  M . Similarly, we can define 
the marginal likelihood 1: 1:( ) ( ; ) ( )  t t p d  M  for data 1: t  from period 1up to 
t . Relative to a base model whose marginal likelihood is 0 ( )M  or 0 1:( ) tM   we 

















The problem is, of course, how to compute the multivariate integrals involved in these 
calculations. From the expression: 
1: 1:( ) ( ; ) ( )  t t p d  M , 
in reality, we have: 
1: 1: 1: 1:( ) ( , ; ) ( )  t t t tp d d    M , 
where   denotes the latent variables in the model –the common factor 
t
f  in our case. 
To perform the computation we resort to particle filtering (PF) given   , the 
posterior mean of the parameters. To conform with notation in the PF literature, we let 
: S . In this work we use the PFMALA filter, see below. 
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Appendix D Particle filtering 
The particle filter methodology can be applied to state space models of the general 
form:  
 1( ) ( )T t t t t ty p y x s p s s     , (A1) 
where ts  is a state variable. For general introductions see Gordon et al. (1993), 
Doucet et al. (2000), Pitt and Shephard (1999), and Ristic et al. (2004).  
Given the data t  the posterior distribution ( )t tp s  can be approximated by a set of 








 . The predictive density can be approximated by:  
 ( ) ( )1 1 1
1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )  

     
N
i i
t t t t t t t t t t
i
p s Y p s s p s ds p s s w , (A2) 
 
and the final approximation for the filtering density is  
 ( ) ( )1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )      

      
N
i i
t t t t t t t t t t t
i
p s p y s p s p y s p s s w . (A3) 
The basic mechanism of particle filtering rests on propagating  ( ) ( ) 1i it ts w i … N      to 
the next step, viz.  ( ) ( )1 1 1i it ts w i … N       but this often suffers from the weight 
degeneracy problem.  
Appendix E Particle metropolis adjusted Langevin filter 
Nemeth, Sherlock and Fearnhead (2014) provide a particle version of a Metropolis 
adjusted Langevin algorithm (MALA).7 In Sequential Monte Carlo we are interested 
in approximating 1( ) t tp s  . Given that:  
 1 1 1 1 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )             t t t t t t t t tp s g y x f s s p s y ds    , (A4) 
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where 1 1 1( )t tp s y      is the posterior as of time 1t  . If at time 1t   we have a set set 
of particles  1 1its i … N      and weights  1 1itw i … N      which form a discrete 
approximation for 1 1 1( )t tp s y      then we have the approximation:  
 1 1 1 1 1
1
ˆ ( ) ( )
N
i i
t t t t t
i
p s y w f s s     

     . (A5) 
See Doucet et al. (2000) and Cappe at al. (2007) for reviews. From (Α3) Fernhead et 
al. (2008) make the important observation that the joint probability of sampling 
particle 1
i
ts   and state ts  is:  
 1 1
1
( ) ( )
( )
i i
t t t t
t i i
t t t t
w g y s f s s












t t tq s s y     is a density function amenable to simulation and:  
 1 1( ) ( ) ( )
i i i
t t t t t t t tq s s y cg y s f s s           , (A7) 
 
and c  is the normalizing constant in (A3). In the MALA algorithm of Roberts and 
Rosenthal (1998)8 we form a proposal  
 
2( ) ( )
12 log ( )     
c s s
Tz p
     (A8) 
where (0 )z N I  which should result in larger jumps and better mixing properties, 





( ) ( )
1
( ) ( )
( ) min 1  



















Using particle filtering it is possible to create an approximation of the score vector 
using Fisher’s identity:  
  1 1 1 1log ( ) log ( )            T T T Tp E p s   , (A10) 
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which corresponds to the expectation of  
 1 1 1 1 1 1 1log ( ) log ( ) log ( ) log ( ),                     T T T T T T T Tp s p s g y s f s s   
over the path 1Ts  . The particle approximation to the score vector results from 
replacing 1 1( )  T Tp s   with a particle approximation, 1 1ˆ ( )  T Tp s   . With particle i 
at time t-1 we can associate a value 1 1 1 1 1log ( )       
i i
t t tp s   which can be updated 
recursively. As we sample i  in the PF (the index of particle at time 1t   that is 
propagated to produce the i th particle at time t) we have the update:  
 1 1log ( ) log ( )
ii i i i
t t t t t ta g y s f s s
          . (A11) 
 
To avoid problems with increasing variance of the score estimate 1log ( )  tp   we 
can use the approximation:  
 1 1 1( )  
i i
t t tm V  . (A12) 
The mean is obtained by shrinking 1
i
t   towards the mean of 1t   as follows:  
 1 1 1 1
1
(1 )   

   
N
i i i i
t t t t
i
m w   , (A13) 
where (0 1)   is a shrinkage parameter. Using Rao-Blackwellization one can avoid 
sampling it  and instead use the following recursion for the means:  
 1 1 1 1
1
(1 ) log ( ) log ( )   

        i i
N
i i i i i
t t t t t t t t
i
m m w m g y s f s s      (A14) 










p w m . (A15) 
As a rule of thumb Nemeth, Sherlock and Fearnhead (2014) suggest taking 0 95  . 
Furthermore, they show the important result that the algorithm should be tuned to the 
asymptotically optimal acceptance rate of 15.47% and the number of particles must be 
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selected so that the variance of the estimated log-posterior is about 3. Additionally, if 
measures are not taken to control the error in the variance of the score vector there is 
no gain over a simple random walk proposal.  
Of course, the marginal likelihood is:  
 1 1 1 1
2
( ) ( ) ( )  





p p y p y   , (A16) 
where:  
 1 1 1 1 1 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )               t t t t t t t T t tp y g y s f s s p s ds ds   , (A17) 
provides, in explicit form, the predictive likelihood. Our implementation, for fixed θ, 
relies on 216=65,536 particles. 
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List of Tables and Figures 
TABLE 1 
Empirical studies on the existence of price asymmetry  
Study Country / product Frequency / Period Stage of transmission Model Findings 
Kristoufek and 
Lunackova (2015) 
Belgium, France, Germany, 
Italy, Netherlands, UK, USA 
/ gasoline  
Weekly / 1996-2014 Retail market ECM No evidence of price asymmetries 
Bumbass et al 
(2015) 
USA / gasoline  Monthly / 1976-2012 Retail market TAR Evidence in favor of long-run symmetric 
adjustment speeds to oil price shocks  
Remer (2015)  New Jersey,Maryland, 
Virginia,Washington, 
Philadelphia, Washington DC 
/ gasoline   
 
Daily / July 2008-
June 2009 
Retail market Panel ECM Retail gasoline prices respond 
asymmetrically to cost increases and 
decreases. 
Polemis and Fotis, 
(2015) 
12 European countries / 
gasoline 
Weekly / June 1996 
August 2011 
Retail market Dynamic OLS Existence of long-run price asymmetry in 
five European countries. Evidence of 
short-run price symmetry in all of the 
sample countries.   
Polemis and Fotis, 
(2014)  
12 European countries, USA / 
gasoline 
 Weekly / June 1996 
August 2011 
Wholesale & retail market Dynamic OLS Less competitive gasoline markets 
exhibit price asymmetry, while highly 
competitive gasoline markets follow a 
symmetric price adjustment path.  
Polemis and Fotis, 
(2013)  
11 Euro zone countries / 
gasoline 
 Weekly / 2000 
February 2011 
Wholesale & retail market GMM panel data ECM Evidence in favor of long-run symmetric 
adjustment speeds in the retail segment.  
Greenwood-
Nimmo and Shin 
(2013) 
United Kingdom / unleaded 
gasoline, diesel, kerosene, gas 
oil 
Monthly / 1999-2013 Retail market Non Linear ADRL Evidence of price asymmetry in diesel, 
kerosene and gasoil. Long-rum symmetry 
in pre-taxed unleaded gasoline   
Polemis (2012) Greece / gasoline Monthly / 1988 mid 
2006 
Wholesale and retail 
market 
ECM Retail gasoline prices respond 
asymmetrically to cost increases and 
decreases. 
Bermingham and 
O’ Brien (2010) 
United Kingdom and Ireland / 
gasoline and diesel 
Monthly / 1997-mid 
2009 




Empirical studies on the existence of price asymmetry (continued)  
Study Country / product Frequency / Period Stage of transmission Model Findings 
Clerides (2010) Several European countries / 
gasoline and diesel 
Weekly 2000-2010 Retail market ECM Mixed results for price asymmetry 
Faber (2009) Netherlands / gasoline Daily / May 2006-
July 2008 
Wholesale / Retail market 
(3600 gas stations) 
ECM 38% of stations respond asymmetrically. 
No evidence of asymmetry at the level of 
the oil companies. 
Valadkhani (2009) Australia / gasoline Monthly / 1998-2009 Retail market ECM Evidence of price asymmetry in four out 
of seven Australian capital cities. 
Kuper and 
Poghosyan (2008) 
U.S. / gasoline  Weekly / 1986-2005 Retail market ECM Pre 1999: International oil price adjusts 
linearly to deviations from the 
long-term equilibrium. 
Post 1999: Evidence of price asymmetry. 
Deltas (2008)  USA / gasoline  Monthly / 1988-2002 Retail market ECM Retail price asymmetry  
Grasso and Manera 
(2007) 
Italy, France, Spain, 
Germany, UK / gasoline 
Monthly / 1985-2003 Retail market ECM, Threshold ECM, 
M-TAR 
ECM: Evidence of price asymmetry for 
all countries 
T – ECM: No evidence of price 
asymmetry 
M-TAR: Long – run price asymmetry 
Radchenko and 
Tsurumi (2006) 
US / gasoline Monthly / 1976 - 
1997 
Retail Market VAR Evidence in favour of symmetric 
adjustment speeds in the retail segment. 
Radchenko (2005) U.S. / gasoline Weekly / 1991, 
1993(1994) - 2003 
Wholesale and retail 
market 




U.S. / gasoline and home 
heating oil 
Monthly / 1986-2002 Wholesale and retail 
market 
ECM Mixed results for price asymmetry 
Bachmeir and 
Griffin (2003) 
U.S.  / gasoline Daily / 1985-1998 Wholesale market ECM Mixed results for price asymmetry 
Galeotti, et al, 
(2003) 
Germany, France, UK, Italy 
and Spain / gasoline 
Monthly / 1985-2000 Wholesale and retail 
market 
ECM Mixed results for price asymmetry 
Note: ECM (Error-Correction Model), M-TAR (Momentum Threshold Autoregressive Model), TAR (Threshold Autoregressive Model), ARDL (Autoregressive Distributed 










Skewness Kurtosis Observations 
Wholesale price 1.250 0.957 4.012 0.350 0.708 0.566 0.933 2.918 9,819 
Retail price 1.414 1.124 4.197 0.474 0.716 0.507 0.938 2.944 9,871 
Spot price  1.146 0.873 3.292 0.307 0.695 0.606 0.924 2.833 206 
Crude oil price  41.781 29.635 133.88 11.35 27.08 0.648 1.113 3.588 206 
Gross profit margin 0.157 0.147 1.902 -0.821 0.070 0.442 2.132 60.267 9,807 
Δ (Wholesale price)  0.010 0.014 0.447 -1.096 0.146 14.394 -1.892 13.553 9,756 
Δ (Retail price) 0.010 0.005 0.549 -1.146 0.144 14.461 -1.935 15.031 9,808 
Average profit 
margin  0.158 0.153 0.265 0.110 0.034 0.212 0.972 4.093 48 
Notes: Table reports summary statistics for the 48 US states in the sample over the period January 1994 to February 2011. All variables except for the price of crude oil 
(dollars per barrel) are in dollars per gallon. Δ denotes change over the previous month. The gross profit margin is computed as the difference between the retail and the 
wholesale price for conventional motor gasoline. The average profit margin is calculated as   t titi Tricewholesaleperetailpric /,, and is measured in dollars per 
gallon of unleaded gasoline. 




Bayes factors for model selection 
 p 2  p 3  p 4  p 5  
q 1  1.000 0.312 0.171 0.005 
q 2  0.216 51.11 1.556 0.054 
q 3  0.116 0.005 0.001 0.001 





Posterior means and standard deviations 
Coefficients 
Spot gasoline price  
Panel A 
Crude oil price  
Panel B 
Wholesale Retail Wholesale Retail 


























































































Notes: The entries in this table report posterior means and posterior standard 
deviations of the most important parameters of the model. Results are reported using 














































































































Profit margin Spot price  Wholesale price Retail price 
 
Source: EIA   
 










Figure 3a. Posterior generalized impulse response functions (Spot gasoline - 10% 
increase) 
 
Notes: The figures present posterior mean estimates of impulse response functions 
corresponding to 10% increase in Spot price of gasoline. The vertical axis is in 
percentage units. 95% Bayes probability intervals (computed by MCMC) are shown 
in dotted lines. 
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Figure 3b. Posterior generalized impulse response functions (Spot gasoline  - 10% 
decrease) 
 
Notes: The figures present posterior mean estimates of impulse response functions 
corresponding to 10% decrease in Spot price of gasoline. The vertical axis is in 
percentage units. 95% Bayes probability intervals (computed by MCMC) are shown 




Figure 4a. Posterior generalized impulse response functions on high profit margin 
states (Spot gasoline - 10% increase)  
 
Notes: The figures present posterior mean estimates of impulse response functions 
corresponding to 10% increase in Spot price of gasoline. The vertical axis is in 
percentage units. 95% Bayes probability intervals (computed by MCMC) are shown 
in dotted lines. 
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Figure 4b. Posterior generalized impulse response functions on low profit margin 
states (Spot gasoline - 10% decrease)  
 
Notes: The figures present posterior mean estimates of impulse response functions 
corresponding to 10% decrease in Spot price of gasoline. The vertical axis is in 
percentage units. 95% Bayes probability intervals (computed by MCMC) are shown 
in dotted lines. 
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